UIC Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 9

Winter 1977

Stone v. Powell: Scope of Habeas Corpus Restricted, 10 J.
Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 401 (1977)
Thomas M. Kilbane Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas M. Kilbane, Jr., Stone v. Powell: Scope of Habeas Corpus Restricted, 10 J. Marshall J. of Prac. &
Proc. 401 (1977)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/9
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

CASENOTES
STONE v. POWELL:
SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS RESTRICTED
The most notable feature of the historical evolution of
federal habeas corpus1 is the expansion of the substantive scope
of the writ, from the common law limitation on the writ to an
inquiry into the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, to the recognition that the writ would reach all constitutional claims.2 In
turn, the importance of the writ grew and its impact on the
administration of criminal justice intensified as the kinds of
claims that could be labeled "constitutional," and thereby cognizable on habeas corpus, became more numerous and less
elementary.'
Perhaps the culmination of this interplay of expanding
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and expanding constitutional
rights was reached in Kaufman v. United States,4 in the context
of the recently fully constitutionalized exclusionary rule. 5 In
1. Habeas corpus is a Latin phrase meaning literally:

'have the body.' The import is that you have the man before
the court in person (and explain by what authority you are detaining him). It is a legal device to give summary relief against
illegal restraint of personal liberty. The legal process employed for
It has for its object
this purpose is the writ of habeas corpus ....
the speedy release by judicial decree, of a person who is illegally
It is a writ of inquiry directed to
restrained of his liberty ....
the person in whose custody the prisoner is detained, requiring the
custodian to bring the prisoner before the judge or court, that appropriate judgment may be rendered upon judicial inquiry into the
alleged unlawful restraint.

R.

PERKINS,

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

922-23 (4th ed. 1972).

The

1948 Judicial Code recodified habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255),
without altering its scope. Post-conviction relief for state prisoners by
way of habeas corpus is now provided chiefly in 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1970), while post-conviction relief for federal prisoners by way of a
statutory motion to vacate is now provided separately in 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (1970). In United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), it was
held that the rights afforded under § 2255 remained as broad as those
afforded on habeas corpus; accord, Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333
(1974); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962); see Annot., 41 L. Ed.
2d 1193 (1975). Unless the context otherwise requires, the use of the
term "habeas corpus" in this article includes both § 2254 and § 2255.
2. See notes 29-46 and accompanying text infra.

3. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83

REV. 1038, 1040 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as Developments].

HARV.

L.

See gen-

erally H.J. FRIENDLY, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS 235 (1967).
4. 394 U.S. 217 (1969), noted in 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 501 (1970).
5. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme
Court abrogated the common law rule that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it is obtained, and
held that evidence unlawfully seized by federal officers is inadmissible
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Kaufman the Court was confronted with the question of whether
a federal prisoner's claim of unconstitutional search and seizure
should be cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Both the Government as respondent and Justice
Black in dissent argued that:
[a]lthough . . . habeas corpus has been thought of broadly as
a means of securing redress for the violation of any 'constitutional right', it was true until Mapp v. Ohio . . . that almost
every 'constitutional right' referred to in this sense played a
central role in assuring that the trial would be a reliable means
of testing guilt.6
But Kaufman squarely held that a federal prisoner's claim that
unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted against him at
trial, in violation of the exclusionary rule, was properly subject
to collateral review,7 notwithstanding that this kind of constitutional claim was only recently recognized and was less elementary than other constitutional claims.8 The Kaufman Court also,
by way of dictum, confirmed that state prisoners' search-andseizure claims were cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.9
The recently decided case of Stone v. Powell' ° expressly
rejected both the holding and the dictum of Kaufman."
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held that where the state
has provided the opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
in federal criminal prosecutions against the victim of the seizure where
timely objection has been made; accord, Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949), the
Court held that the fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
and thereby enforceable against the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, but that the exclusionary rule would
not be applied to the states as "an essential ingredient of the right."
For a discussion of the status of the rule in the states during this
interim period see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). In Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655, 657 (1961), the exclusionary rule was held to be "an
essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and
declared applicable to the states: "all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court." See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 959 (1962).
6. 394 U.S. at 236 (Black, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 231.
8. Developments, supra note 3, at 1040.
9. 394 U.S. at 225-28.
10. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (a consolidation of two cases, Stone v
Powell and Wolff v. Rice).
11. The issue in Kaufman was the scope of § 2255. Our decision
today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the applicability.
of the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of state
court decisions pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the application
of the exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the supervisory role of this Court over the lower federal courts, . . . the
rationale for its application in that context is also rejected.
Id. at 3045 n.16 (1976). The Kaufman Court did not rely on the supervisory rationale to any significant extent; see notes 53-58 and accompanying
text infra.
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search-and-seizure claim, the Constitution does not require that a
state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted
against him at trial in violation of the exclusionary rule. The
significance of the decision is twofold: not only does it cast
doubts upon the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule, but
it also signals the end of the expansion of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction, and the beginning of a contraction that will be "of
considerable importance to the administration of criminal jus2
tice."'
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Powell, respondent in Stone v. Powell, was convicted of
murder in a California Superior Court. During an argument
with the manager of a liquor store, respondent shot and killed
the manager's wife. Ten hours later respondent was arrested
in Henderson, Nevada, for violation of a local vagrancy ordinance. The arresting officer conducted a search incident to the
arrest and discovered the murder weapon. At respondent's murder trial the officer's testimony was introduced, over respondent's
objection that the evidence should have been excluded because
the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional and the arrest and
search therefore invalid.
A California District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding it
unnecessary to reach the issue of the admissibility of the evidence
as it concluded that any error in admission of the testimony was
harmless under Chapman v. California.13 Powell's petition for
state habeas relief was then denied.
Respondent then petitioned for a writ of federal habeas corpus in federal district court, alleging that he was in custody in
violation of the Constitution, and thereby entitled to relief under
the federal habeas corpus statute.' 4 The court held that the
arresting officer had probable cause and that even if the
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule
should not apply to the fruits of an otherwise valid arrest. 15
In the alternative, the court held that any error in admission
of the evidence was harmless.
12. 96 S. Ct. at 3039.
13. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For an examination of the harmless error
question in the search-and-seizure context see Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 128
(1970).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
15. The district court's opinion was unreported.
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The court of appeals reversed, holding the vagrancy statute
unconstitutional, the arrest and search therefore illegal, and the
admission of the evidence therefore erroneous. 16 Exclusion in
such a case would deter enactment of such unconstitutional stat17
utes and uphold the imperative of judicial integrity.
Rice, respondent in Wolff v. Rice, was convicted in a
Nebraska state court of murder, in connection with the bombing
death of a policeman. The prosecution relied in part on evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant. Respondent's motion to
suppress the evidence seized on the ground that the warrant was
invalid was denied. On appeal the Supreme Court of Nebraska
upheld the validity of the warrant and affirmed.' 8
Respondent then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus1 9
in the United States District Court for Nebraska. The court held
that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was fatally
defective and the search warrant therefore invalid. 20 The court
then rejected the state's alternative contention that probable
cause justified the search. 21 The court of appeals affirmed on the
22
same reasoning.
Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the state prisons where
Powell and Rice respectively were being held, petitioned for certiorari, raising the issue of the scope of federal habeas corpus
and the role of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of
cases involving search-and-seizure claims. In the orders granting
certiorari the Supreme Court requested that counsel address
themselves to the question of the cognizability of search-andseizure claims on federal habeas corpus. 23 The Court reversed
and held that:
where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does
not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in 24
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.

16. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 98. The contention by the appellee that failure to apply
the exclusionary rule should not be cognizable on habeas corpus was
raised "for the record" and dismissed as "contrary to recent precedent."
Id. at 97 n.4.
18. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).

19. See note 14 supra.

20. Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-94 (D. Neb. 1974) (citing
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).
21. 388 F. Supp. at 195-202.
22. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).

23. Stone v. Powell, Wolff v. Rice, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975).
24. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3046 (1976).

Stone v. Powell
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THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
25

HistoricalBackground

Though the Constitution provided that "[the Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended

'26

and the

first grant of federal court jurisdiction authorized federal courts
to issue writs of habeas corpus,

27

neither delineated the substan-

tive scope of the writ. The courts adhered to the common law
to an
principle that habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited
28
court.
sentencing
the
of
jurisdiction
the
inquiry into
The Habeas Corpus Act of 186729 extended federal habeas
corpus to state prisoners and did provide a statement as to the
substantive scope of the writ. The federal courts were authorized "to grant writs in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution
30 Despite the breadth of the language used, courts con....
tinued to limit the writ to an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court."'
However, not long afterwards began a lengthy and fitful
expansion of the scope of issues cognizable on habeas. The concept of the lack of jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal was
expanded3 2 to include allegations going to the illegality of the
sentence,3 3 and to the unconstitutionality of the statute under
which the petitioner was convicted A4 A more significant expan25. The Stone Court's summary of the historical development of
federal habeas corpus appears in 96 S. Ct. at 3042-45.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
27. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (supplemented by

Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, later codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255

(1970)). The writ in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was limited to federal
prisoners. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. Rv. 441, 465-66 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Bator].
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830);
accord, Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1812); see Bator,
supra note 27, at 466; Developments, supra note 3, at 1043.

29. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
30. Id.
31. Developments, supra note 3, at 1049-50:

The broad language of the 1867 Act was not taken as an invitation
to review all federal questions once decided by the state court. The

traditional test remained: the petitioner would be released only if
the committing court was without jurisdiction. Indeed, under the
then current view of fourteenth amendment due process rights, if a
state prisoner had been convicted by a court with jurisdiction, he
had been accorded the process which was due.

Id. (footnotes omitted). See Bator, supra note 27, at 479 & n.91, 481-82.
32. Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 104 (1959) [hereinafter cited as

Hart].
33. See, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873); see also
Bator, supra note 27, at 467-68; Developments, supra note 3, at 1046.
34. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); see also Bator,

supra note 27, at 468.
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sion was undertaken in Frank v. Mangum8 5 and realized in
Moore v. Dempsey.36 Though scholars differ as to the respective
effects of the two decisions, 37 it seems clear that Frank stands
for the proposition that, if the federal habeas corpus court
finds that a state tribunal has failed to supply 'corrective proccess' with respect to the full and fair litigation of federal questions, whether or not 'jurisdictional,'in a state criminal proceeding, a court on habeas may appropriately inquire into38the merits
in order to determine whether the detention is lawful.
It seems equally clear that Moore carried the law beyond
Frank,39 because the Court in Moore proceeded affirmatively to
redetermine the petitioner's federal due process claim on the
merits. 40 At any rate, the two cases taken together definitely
expanded the scope of habeas corpus review: due process claims
were now cognizable. 4 1
The next stage in the expansion of the substantive scope of
habeas corpus was the decision in Brown v. Allen.4 2 There the
Supreme Court affirmed petitioners' convictions but not on the
ground that the petitioners had been accorded due process in the
state courts, as was held in Frank v. Mangum. Rather, the
Brown Court considered and rejected on the merits the petitioners' constitutional claims, even though those claims had been
fully adjudicated in the state courts.43 Though the Court in
Stone never made this explicit, 44 Brown is viewed by the com-

mentators as standing for the proposition that all constitutional
claims were cognizable on federal habeas corpus, regardless of
whether the state court had provided due process or had fully
35.
36.
37.
cilable

237 U.S. 309 (1915).
261 U.S. 86 (1923)..
Compare Bator, supra note 27, at 489 (Moore viewed as reconwith Frank), with Hart, supra note 32, at 105 (Frank viewed as

discredited by Moore) and Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an
Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315, 1329 (1961) (Frank

viewed as overruled by Moore).
1050-54.

See Developments, supra note 3, at

38. Bator, supra note 27, at 486-87. The Court in Frank v. Mangum,

237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915), concluded that the state court had supplied
adequate "corrective process" and that therefore there was no need to
inquire into the merits.
39. Developments, supra note 3, at 1052.

40. Id. The Court in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923),
apparently concluded that adequate "corrective process" had not been
supplied.
41. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 3, at 1115-16.
42. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (state prisoners' petitions for federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that racial discrimination in grand and
petit jury selections rendered their detention "in violation of the Constitution" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, despite the fact that their claim had
been fully litigated in the state courts; both the district court and the
court of appeals denied their petitions on that ground, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari).
43. Bator, supra note 27, at 500.
44. 96 S.Ct. at 3043.

1977]

Stone v. Powell

and fairly considered the claim. 4 5 The federal habeas corpus
court could readjudicate the state prisoner's constitutional claim
on the merits, despite the fact that the claim had been fully litigated on the merits in the state courts, because the state court
may have misconceived a federal constitutional right 46 or may
have applied an erroneous constitutional standard, as was clearly
the case in the Nebraska Supreme Court's affirmance of respondent Rice's conviction. 47 Stone v. Powell abrogates the holding
of Brown v. Allen as to fourth amendment claims that were
raised and considered on the merits in the state courts.
After reviewing the history of the expansion of issues cognizable on habeas corpus, 48 the Court in Stone noted that during
this period of expansion, the question of whether exceptions
should exist with regard to particular categories of constitutional
claims was never considered by the Supreme Court. 49 However,

the Court further noted that a majority of the lower federal
courts had concluded that fourth amendment claims of federal
prisoners were not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.50 The
chief reason advanced for this discrimination among constitutional rights, according to the Court,
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in kind
from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in that claims
of illegal search and seizure do not 'impugn the integrity of the
fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable; rather the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply
a prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers.' 51
45. Developments, supra note 3, at 1057, 1117; Bator, supra note 27,
at 444; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 155 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Friendly]; Hart, supra note 32, at 106.
46. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 508 (Frankfurter, J.).
47. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972). One basis
of the Nebraska court's affirmance of respondent's conviction was its
position that an otherwise defective affidavit for search warrant may
be supplemented by additional facts brought out later at a suppression
hearing, a position clearly untenable in the light of several explicit
Supreme Court decisions. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565
n.8 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.3 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964).
48. The Court also discussed, 96 S. Ct. at 3043-44, the further expansion of habeas corpus in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which held
that a state prisoner's failure to appeal to raise a coerced confession
claim, motivated by the fear of a possible death sentence on retrial,
would not alone bar federal habeas corpus review. The Fay decision
also confirmed that habeas corpus would lie to reach all constitutional
claims. Id. at 434. See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (a
state prisoner's claim of coerced confession not raised on appeal was
cognizable on habeas corpus within the guidelines established by the
Court).
49. 96 S. Ct. at 3044.
50. Id. at 3044 & n.12. See Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822,
824 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and cases cited therein.
51. 96 S. Ct. at 3044 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217, 224 (1969)),
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The quoted portion of the above argument was raised by the
Government in Kaufman. The Court, while considering the argument in the majority opinion, rejected it and went on to hold
that federal prisoners' claims were cognizable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.52 But the chief reason advanced by the Kaufman
Court for its holding was that, supposedly, this argument had
already been rejected in prior Supreme Court decisions extending
the federal habeas corpus remedy to state prisoners, and the fact
that federal prisoners had already had their day in federal court
was no good reason to discriminate between state and federal
prisoners here.58 However, as was made clear in Kaufman by
Justice Black in dissent and is stressed by the Court in Stone,
the precedent value of the "string of citations that supposedly
settle the question" is most weak;5 4 in no case relied on by
the majority in Kaufman had the issue of the cognizability
of search-and-seizure claims on habeas corpus ever been addressed. 55

However, the Kaufman Court also advanced the argument
that adequate protection of constitutional rights in a criminal
trial requires the continuing availability of a mechanism for relief.56 The availability of federal collateral remedies functions
as a safeguard of the integrity of criminal proceedings before
trial, at trial, and on appeal, and assures the preservation of all
constitutional rights whether or not related to the integrity of
the factfinding process. 57 As Justice Brennan argued in his dissent in Stone, the threat of habeas corpus requires that all trial
and appellate courts "conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards." 58 The Court
52. 394 U.S. at 231.
53. 394 U.S. at 225-26. "Our decisions leave no doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitu-

tionally obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial." Id. at

225.

54. Id. at 239 & n.7.

See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. at 3045 n.15;

Note, Kaufman v. United States, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 503 & n.18,
505 n.27 (1970).

55. Of the cases cited by the Kaufman Court, Mancusi v. De Forte,
392 U.S. 364 (1968), was concerned with the issue of standing to raise
a constitutional claim; Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), with

the issue of custody as a prerequisite to petition for the writ; Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), with the legality of the seizure and the
admissibility of the evidence itself; Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443
(1965), with the adequate state ground limitation on Supreme Court

appellate review; in none was the issue of cognizability of search-andseizure claims addressed. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965) (a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus proceeding, holding that
the Mapp exclusionary rule would not be applied retroactively, without
discussing the scope of federal habeas corpus).
56. 394 U.S. at 226.
57. Id. at 229.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 3064 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ); see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
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in Stone never squarely confronted this rationale, although it was
argued by respondents in Stone, but merely chided respondents
for their basic mistrust of state proceedings as fair and competent
adjudications of federal constitutional rights. In addition, the
Court declared its unwillingness to assume a present general lack
of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the state
courts.

9

Finally, the Stone Court acknowledged that, despite the fact
that re-evaluation of the scope of federal habeas had been called
for from several quarters, 60 the Supreme Court continued to
accept jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases in which prisoners
claimed that unconstitutionally seized evidence was erroneously
admitted against them at trial. 61 But after Kaufman the issue
of the cognizability of search-and-seizure claims on habeas corpus
was not squarely presented to the Court until Stone v. Powell,
in which the Court concluded that the view espoused in Kaufman was unjustified "in the light of the nature and purpose of
' '6 2
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
59. 96 S. Ct. at 3051 n.35.
60. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring), criticized in Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas
Corpus Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L.
REV. 484. See also Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. Rsv. 378 (1964); Bator, supra note 27, at 441-62,
502-28; Doub, The Case Against Modern Federal Habeas Corpus, 57
A.B.A.J. 323 (1971); Friendly, supra note 45; Miller & Shepherd, New
Look at an Ancient Writ: Habeas Corpus Reexamined, 9 U. RICH. L.
REV. 49 (1974); Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in
Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated?, 21 DE PAUL L.
REV. 740 (1972). However, the writ has not been without supporters.
See, e.g., Carroll, Habeas Corpus Reform: Can Habeas Survive the
Flood?, 6 CUM. L. REV. 363 (1975); Chisum, In Defense of Modern Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,21 DE PAUL L. REV. 682 (1972);
Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The
Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 701 (1972); Wulf,
Limiting Prisoner Access to Habeas Corpus-Assault on the Great Writ,
40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 253 (1973).

61. 96 S. Ct. at 3045 (citing Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283

(1975) (state prisoner's habeas corpus petition granted on ground that
narcotics conviction resulting from introduction of evidence seized under
an unconstitutionally vague loitering statute was obtained in violation
of the Constitution); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (habeas
petition denied on merits); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)
(habeas corpus petition denied on merits) ). Other cases in which the
Court reviewed forth amendment claims raised by habeas corpus petition, not cited by the Court in Stone, include: Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972) (petition denied on merits); Whiteley v. Warden, 401
U.S. 560 (1971) (warrantless arrest without probable cause invalidated
subsequent search, evidence seized should have been excluded, petition
granted on merits); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (petition
denied on merits). See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (mandamus proceeding to compel lower federal court to permit discovery in
state prisoner's federal habeas corpus proceeding on search-and-seizure
claim, writ of mandamus granted).
62. 96 S. Ct. at 3045 (emphasis added). The view espoused in
Kaufman was as follows:
IT]he effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting
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Nature and Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule

The Court's examination of the exclusionary rule began with
a summary of its historical evolution. 3 Particular stress was
placed on the fact that the "exclusionary rule was a judicially
created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment. 0 1 4 The Court then proceeded to an evaluation of
the principal reasons for application of the exclusionary rule, the
6 5
normative and the factual justifications.
The Normative Justification
The normative justification for application of the exclusionary rule, variously alluded to as the "imperative of judicial
integrity,"6 6 proceeds on the basis that courts should not participate in illegal behavior by using unconstitutionally seized evidence. 67 The Court in Stone demonstrated persuasively the
limited force that this justification has had in past decisions
involving the scope of the exclusionary rule, 66 and concluded
of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state
court on the basis of evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure since those amendments were held in Mapp v. Ohio . . . to
require exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review.
Id. (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 3046-47. See note 5 supra.
64. Id. at 3046. Accord, United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3035
(1976) (holding that evidence seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer pursuant to a defective warrant is nonetheless admissible
in a federal civil tax proceeding).
65. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 665, 666-72 [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
66. 96 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960)). Elkins abrogated the "silver platter" doctrine, whereby,
prior to the application of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), evidence unconstitutionally seized by state
officers could be handed on a "silver platter" to federal authorities for
use in federal criminal proceedings, although under Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), such evidence would have been inadmissible in federal criminal proceedings had it been unlawfully seized by
federal officers.
67. Oaks, supra note 65, at 666, 668. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
13 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 484-85
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394
(1914).
68. 96 S. Ct. at 3047. The Court noted that, logically extended, the
normative justification would require abandonment of: the requirement of timely objection to the admission of illegally seized evidence,
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); the requirement of standing
to object to the admission of illegally seized evidence, Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); the proposition that a court has
jurisdiction over the defendant's person, though unconstitutionally
seized, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); the permissible use of
illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings, United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); the permissible use of illegally seized
evidence for impeachment purposes, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954). As Professor Oaks has observed, "[a]lthough the normative
justification . . . continues to appear in the rhetoric of Supreme Court
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that this justification is limited in the first instance and becomes
minimal in the context of habeas corpus review of search-andseizure claims. 6 9 As to why it becomes minimal, the only
support that the Court offers consists of oblique references to
the arguments that the evidence sought to be excluded is typically highly probative, and is frequently seized in good-faith reliance on existing law. 0 As Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion7 1 and Justice White's dissenting opinion 7 2 demonstrate,
both reasons are chiefly arguments against the application at
trial of the exclusionary rule in its present form, and are by no
means limited to the context of habeas corpus review of searchand-seizure claims; both arguments indicate that hostility to the
exclusionary rule itself underlies the decision in the case at hand.
The FactualJustification
The Court then turned to the principal rationale for application of the exclusionary rule, the factual argument that exclusion
of illegally seized evidence will deter law enforcement officials
from the illegal behavior.7 3 Deterrence of fourth amendment
violations has been termed the "single and distinct" purpose of
the exclusionary rule.7 4 The Court placed heavy stress on this
and on the fact that in post-Mapp decisions the rule is not considered a personal constitutional right, 75 but rather a judicial
remedy created to protect fourth amendment rights in general
through its deterrent effect. 76 The Court concluded that the
rule's application should be limited to those areas where its deterrent purpose would be advanced. 77
decisions, it is doubtful that this argument decides cases." Oaks, supra
note 65, at 669.
69. 96 S. Ct. at 3048.
70. Id. at 3047 & n.23.
71. Id. at 3052 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (expressing his willingness to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule to cases of "egregious,
bad-faith conduct," and perhaps to eliminate the rule altogether). See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
72. 96 S. Ct. at 3071 (White, J., dissenting) (expressing his dis-

agreement with the holding of the majority, but indicating his willingness to modify the exclusionary rule so as to prevent its application at
trial in cases of seizures made in good-faith reliance on existing law).
73. Oaks, supra note 65, at 671.
74. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966).
75. 96 S. Ct. at 3048. For a discussion, of the premise that recognition of this principle inevitably leaves the exclusionary rule vulnerable to repeal see Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: 'The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
76. 96 S. Ct. at 3048 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974), and citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Tehan v. United States

ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.

618, 637 (1965) ).

77. "As in the case of any remedial device, 'the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
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The Court then examined decisions in which the deterrence
that application of the exclusionary rule would have in a particular context was deemed to be outweighed by the costs that application of the rule would engender. It was this cost/benefits
analysis or balancing process that determined that the exclusionary rule would not be applied to grand jury proceedings, '7 to
the introduction of illegally seized evidence for impeachment
purposes,7' 9 and with regard to those who were not the victims
of the illegal search; 0 the same balancing process was evident
in cases considering whether search-and-seizure holdings should
be applied retroactively,"' and in cases addressing the "attenuation-of-the-taint" doctrine.8 2
The Court then proceeded to
apply this balancing test to the case at hand.
Cost/Benefits Analysis
The question posed by the case at hand was whether state
prisoners' claims that unconstitutionally seized evidence was
admitted against them at trial, in violation of the fourth and
fourteenth amendment exclusionary rule, resulting in their conviction and detention in violation of the Constitution, should be
cognizable on federal habeas corpus review; or whether the fact
that their claims had been given full and fair consideration in
the state courts foreclosed federal habeas corpus review.8 3 The
answer, according to the Court, was to be determined by balancing "the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of
thought most efficaciously served.'" 96 S. Ct. at 3048 (quoting United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
,78. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
79. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
80. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
81. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
82. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United
The same balancing process has
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1963).
also been employed in lower courts in the context of parole revocation
hearings, United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161
(2d Cir. 1970) (illegally obtained evidence held admissible in parole
revocation hearings); and in the context of sentencing, United States
v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971), noted in 71 COLUM. L.
REv. 1102 (1971) (unlawfully seized evidence inadmissible at trial may
be used in sentencing where evidence is reliable and not gathered to
influence the sentencing judge). But see Verdugo v. United States, 402
F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970) (illegally
obtained evidence not admissible for sentencing purposes since wide
range of possible sentence may have been the incentive for the illegal
seizure). See Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 856 (1975).
83. 96 S. Ct. at 3049, 3052 & n.36. "Full and fair consideration" means
here that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing and reach
and decide the constitutional claim on the merits. Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 314 (1963).
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extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment
84
claims."
The Court stressed the costs of applying the exclusionary
rule at trial and on appeal: "application of the rule .. .deflects
the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty."' 5 These
costs, said the Court, persist with special force when the exclusionary rule is applied on habeas corpus review. 8 6 In turn, the
benefits that would be achieved by making search-and-seizure
claims cognizable on habeas corpus are minimal in both the short
run, in terms of additional deterrence, and in the long run, in
terms of contributing to an awareness of fourth amendment values. 7 Thus, since costs outweigh benefits, a federal court may
not "apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review" of a searchand-seizure claim unless there is a showing that the state prisoner was denied the opportunity for full and fair litigation of
88
his claim at trial and on direct review.
In developing the foundation for its holding the Court
reviewed the evolution of the writ and determined that constitutional claims have not always been cognizable on habeas corpus.
It noted the weak precedent value of the decisions relied on by
the Kaufman Court. It then established that the exclusionary
rule is neither an absolute nor a personal constitutional right,
that its function is deterrence, and that its application in a particular context is only mandated where the benefits to be derived
thereby are not outweighed by costs. The Court demonstrated
how this balancing process operated in various cases, 9 such as
United States v. Calandra,which held that the exclusionary rule
need not be applied in grand jury proceedings.9 0 Then the Court
performed this balancing process to determine if federal courts
must "apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review." 91
However, in formulating the issue as whether federal courts
must "apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review," the Court
clearly gave primacy to what was at best a collateral issue in
the case at hand. Rather, the principal question presented for
84. 96 S. Ct. at 3049.
85. Id. at 3050. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal

Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926); Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 388-91
(1964) (but see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,

58

MINN.

L. REV. 349, 476 n.598 (1974)); Burger, Who Will Watch the

Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1964); Friendly, supra note 45,
at 161-62; Oaks, supra note 65, at 736-55; Wright, Must the Criminal Go
Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736 (1972).

86. 96 S. Ct. at 3052.
87. Id. at 3051-52. See Oaks, supra note 65, at 668, 756.
88. 96 S.Ct. at 3052 n.37 (emphasis added).
89. See notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
90. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).

91. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n.37.
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decision was whether a state court's failure to apply the exclusionary rule at trial is a constitutional claim cognizable on federal
habeas review. As Justice Brennan cogently argues in dissent,
the constitutional cost/benefits analysis approach to this case is
completely illogical so long as Mapp v. Ohio92 remains undisturbed; 93 and the majority decision does leave Mapp and the
exclusionary rule as applied at trial undisturbed.9 4 Yet, Mapp
undoubtedly held that the Constitution requires that state courts
exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence from the trial of the
victim of the illegal seizure. If the evidence is not excluded and
the defendant is convicted and detained, his custody is in violation of the Constitution.9" But, somehow, he is no longer in
custody in violation of the Constitution when he seeks habeas
corpus relief on the ground that the trial court, in violation of
the Constitution, misapplied constitutional principles and failed
to apply the exclusionary rule at trial. There is no question of
applying the exclusionary rule on collateral review here, no costs
to be weighed against benefits as to whether the rule should be
extended to habeas corpus proceedings, because all of the costs
of applying the rule should already have been incurred at trial
or on direct review if the state court had performed its constitutional duty. As such, these costs were assessed and considered
outweighed when the exclusionary rule was fashioned.9 6
Therefore, "shorn of the rhetoric of 'interest balancing' used
to obscure what is at stake in this case," what is taking place
in Stone is the relegation of fourth amendment rights to secondclass status for purposes of collateral review,9 7 and the contraction of the scope of habeas corpus, marking the end of a period
92. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
93. 96 S. Ct. at 3058 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan continues:
Under Mapp, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state court
must exclude evidence from the trial of an individual whose Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by a search or
seizure that .

.

. resulted in the acquisition of that evidence.

. . . When a state court admits such evidence, it has committed a
constitutional error, and unless that error is harmless . . . it follows ineluctably that the defendant has been placed 'in custody

in violation of the Constitution' within the comprehension of 28
U.S.C. § 2254. In short, it escapes me as to what logic can support
the assertion that the defendant's unconstitutional confinement
obtains during the process of direct review

. . .

but that the uncon-

stitutionality then suddenly dissipates at the moment the claim is
asserted in a collateral attack on the conviction.
Id. at 3058-59.
94. 96 S. Ct. at 3051.
95. "The erroneous admission of such evidence is a violation of the
Federal Constitution-Mapp inexorably means at least this much, or
there would be no basis for applying the exclusionary rule in state
criminal proceedings .....
Id. at 3059 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 3060 n.10.
97. Id. at 3058, 3061.
"
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of expansion that had been underway for over a hundred
years. 98 And it is not unlikely that the reversal of this trend
will continue. 99 Though there may be sound reasons and policy
for contraction of the scope of habeas corpus, 10 the constitutional interest-balancing rationale employed by the Stone Court
is inadequate support for the result.
CONCLUSION

That Stone v. Powell represents a reversal of the trend of
expanding federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is obvious. The
contraction of the cognizability of fourth amendment claims to
those which did not receive full and fair consideration at trial
and on direct review puts habeas corpus jurisdiction in this context back to a pre-Brown v. Allen' 0' position. As to searchand-seizure claims on federal habeas corpus, the state of the law
today is where it was when Frank v. Mangum'0 2 was handed
down in 1915. If the state or the federal trial court provides
adequate corrective process, that is, a hearing and decision on
the merits, for the full and fair litigation of search-and-seizure
claims, then those claims are not cognizable on federal habeas
corpus, even if there is constitutional error in the adjudication.
The effect that Stone will have is uncertain. The possibility
of further contraction of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, especially as to other constitutional claims deemed non-guilt related
is certainly present.'0 3 An even more troubling implication is
the possibility that removal of the threat of federal collateral
review will lead to a less conscientious application of the exclusionary rule in the state courts and to a watering down of fourth
amendment rights. 10 4 In any event, the importance of the decision, in its reversal of the trend of expanding federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, and in its possible evisceration of the exclusionary rule, is undeniable. One can only hope that future decisions
98. See notes 29-46 and accompanying text supra.

99. See 96 S. Ct. 3061-68 passim (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Justice

Brennan's second ground for dissent (that the majority decision represents a judicial rewriting of the habeas corpus statutes, and is therefore "an arrogation of power committed solely to the Congress,") lacks

the devastating logic of his first, because although the basic statutory
formulation of habeas corpus jurisdiction has remained unchanged
since the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 (Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1,
14 Stat. 385), that jurisdiction has been the subject of a myriad of
judicial rewritings. That the Stone Court contracts rather than expands

the scope of habeas corpus review should not obscure this basic historical fact.
100.

See Developments, supra note 3, at 1269.

See, e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 441-62, 502-28; Friendly, supra

note 45.

101. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

102. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
103. 96 S. Ct. at 3062-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

104. Id. at 3071.
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in the areas of habeas corpus and the exclusionary rule will, in
the words of Justice Brennan, "at least be accomplished with
some modicum of logic and justification not provided today."''1
Thomas M. Kilbane, Jr.

105. Id. at 3070.

